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Humans use kinematic temporal and spatial information from the environment to infer the
causal dynamics (e.g., force) of an event.We hypothesize that the basis for these inferences
are malleable and modulated by contextual temporal and spatial information. Specifically,
the present research investigates whether the extent of a person’s ongoing experience
with direct causal events (e.g., temporally contiguous and spatially continuous) alters their
use of time and space in judgments of causality. Participants made inferences of causality
on animated launching events depicting a blue ball colliding with and then “launching” a red
ball. We parametrically manipulated temporal contiguity and spatial continuity by varying
the duration of contact between the balls and the angle of the second ball’s movement.
We manipulated participants’ level of exposure to direct causal events (i.e., events with
no delay or angle change) between experiments (Experiment 1: 2%, Experiment 2: 25%,
Experiment 3: 75%). We found that participants adjust the temporal and spatial parame-
ters they use to judge causality to accommodate the context in which they apprehended
launching events. Participants became more conservative in their use of temporal and
spatial parameters to judge causality as their exposure to direct causal events increased.
People use time and space flexibly to infer causality based on their ongoing experiences.
Such flexibility in making causal inferences may have adaptive significance.
Keywords: causality, causal inference and perception, contextual information, decision-making, time, space,
temporal contiguity, spatial continuity
INTRODUCTION
The ability to infer causal structure in events is a central feature of
human cognition (e.g., Hume, 1740/1960, 1748/1977; Michotte,
1946/1963). Many researchers argue that the ability to infer causal
relationships in physical and social events is an innate facet of
human cognitive systems (e.g., Michotte, 1946/1963; Leslie, 1982,
1984; Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Oakes and Cohen, 1990; Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2001; Wolpert, 2003, 2006,
2009). This ability allows us to understand relationships in our
environment, predict future outcomes, and plan goal-directed
actions. Wolpert (2003, 2009) argues that causal inferences set
humans apart from animals and was critical in the evolution of
Homo sapiens.
We use kinematic information, like time and space, to infer
the dynamic properties of an event. In other words, we use vis-
ible parameters to make inferences about invisible forces (i.e.,
dynamics). Wolff (2007, 2008) suggests that we make causal-
ity judgments based on such inferences of invisible forces. The
notion of force is of course derived from the apprehension of
acceleration (f=ma; f= force, m=mass) that itself is depen-
dent on how an object changes in time and space (a=∆v/∆t;
v =∆d/∆t; a= acceleration, v = velocity, d = displacement in
space, t = interval of time). The kinematic properties of objects
in time and space fundamentally contribute to our judgments of
causality in mechanical events (Schlottmann and Shanks, 1992;
Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000; Blakemore et al., 2003; Guski and
Troje, 2003; Roser et al., 2005; Schlottmann et al., 2006; Wolff,
2007, 2008; Buehner and Humphreys, 2010).
The present research investigates the mapping of time and space
on to causal judgments. Specifically, we examine the role of the
context in which participants apprehend kinematic temporal and
spatial information. Contextual information strongly modulates
human decision-making (e.g., Rohrbaugh and Shanteau, 1999; De
Martino et al., 2006; Dror et al., 2006) by allowing us to integrate
relevant proximate information. It plays an important role in how
we interpret events and plan appropriate responses. For example,
imagine a person standing in a room with a dangerous animal.
What would you infer to be the person’s next action? What if the
person standing in the room is a zookeeper or the animal is inside
a cage? Contextual information alters our interpretation of the
relationship between objects in an event, as well as our predic-
tions of the actions and subsequent reactions of the objects. The
same appears to be true for inferences of causality in events (e.g.,
Gruber et al., 1957; Powesland, 1959; Shanks, 1985; Schlottmann,
1999; Buehner and May, 2002, 2003).
Previous research suggests that contextual information pro-
vided by foreknowledge about the temporal characteristics of an
event can influence how we interpret the relationship between time
and causality (e.g., Schlottmann, 1999; Buehner and May, 2002).
Schlottmann (1999) and Buehner and May (2002, 2003) demon-
strated that the role of temporal information in causal inferences is
mediated by people’s assumptions about the timeframe of events.
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For example, when people expect a delay in events, they expand
the temporal delays they are willing to incorporate in their causal
inferences. That is to say, people are willing to bridge the temporal
gap in the event and infer a causal relationship.
Gruber et al. (1957) and Powesland (1959) also found that prior
experience with clearly causal or non-causal events alters peo-
ple’s representation of the relationship between time and causality.
Gruber et al. (1957) found that providing participants with prior
experience on practice trials demonstrating large violations of
temporal contiguity (i.e., time delays) in a bridge collapse event
relaxed subsequent temporal criteria for causal judgments. Powes-
land (1959) found that previous experience with practice trials
demonstrating causal events without violations of kinematic tem-
poral information (i.e., no time delay) made subsequent temporal
criteria for causal judgments more conservative. Furthermore,
Powesland demonstrated that inserting a series of example tri-
als between blocks of events also influenced temporal criteria
used to make causal judgments. Collectively, these data suggest
that contextual information influences our interpretation of the
relationship between time and causality.
While the use of temporal information to infer causality appears
susceptible to context, the susceptibility of spatial information to
context remains unknown. Furthermore, although prior expe-
rience and foreknowledge influence inferences of causality, it
remains unclear whether ongoing exposure to contextual infor-
mation modulates the contributions of time and space to causal
inferences. In the present study, we focus on the role of contex-
tual information in causal inferences using depictions of simple
mechanical events (e.g., two balls colliding). We hypothesize that
contextual information modulates the use of kinematic tempo-
ral and spatial information when inferring causality. The present
study focuses on two aspects of temporal contiguity and spa-
tial continuity: temporal delay and linearity of movement. In the
present study, we specifically investigate whether contextual infor-
mation provided by recent and ongoing experience with direct
causal events (a mechanical event depicting a linear collision with-
out any delay) influences participants’ judgments of how time and
space contributes to causality. Consistent with Powesland’s (1959)
findings, we propose that the proportion of recent experience with
direct causal events will lead participants to interpret the relation-
ship between time, space, and causality more conservatively. That
is to say, people with increased exposure to direct causal events
will only accept smaller violations of time and space as causal.
Such a finding would suggest malleability of the use of time and
space in judgments of causality, specifically in response to ongoing
changing dynamics in a sequence of events.
To test our hypotheses, we varied the proportion of direct causal
events in three experiments (Experiment 1: 2%, Experiment 2:
25%, Experiment 3: 75%). Unlike previous research, we manip-
ulated the probability of exposure to direct causal events during
the actual experiment, rather than with previous experience (e.g.,
practice trials; Powesland, 1959) or foreknowledge of underlying
mechanisms (e.g., Schlottmann, 1999; Buehner and May, 2002,
2003). Thus, changes in the contribution of kinematic temporal
and spatial information to causal inferences would reflect response
to recent and ongoing experience with clearly causal events. Fur-
thermore, the present research extends our understanding of the
role of spatial information in causality, whereas previous research
only investigated the influence of temporal contextual informa-
tion. Experiment 1 provided a baseline for comparison of the
context manipulation and evaluated participants’ general repre-
sentation of the relationship between time, space, and causality.
Experiment 2 investigated whether an increase in proportion of
exposure to direct causal events modulates the contribution of
time and space to causal inferences (i.e., causal context). Finally,
Experiment 3 sought to extend findings from Experiment 2 by
exposing participants to trials predominantly composed of direct
causal events.
EXPERIMENT 1
We presented participants with launching events containing para-
metric manipulations of time and space relevant to causality.
Launching events have a long history in the study of causality
(e.g., Hume, 1740/1960, 1748/1977; Michotte, 1946/1963; Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000, etc.). These simple mechanical events por-
tray one ball moving toward, contacting, and launching a second
ball into motion. An increase in the time between initial contact of
the first object and the initial movement of the second object or an
increase in the deviation of the angle of egress for the second object
decreases the likelihood of causal perception (e.g., see for examples
Schlottmann and Anderson, 1993; Straube and Chatterjee, 2010).
Participants in Experiment 1 made inferences of causality
on 98 launching events. Only two of the 98 launching events
depicted direct causal launches (no time delay, no change in angle).
The remaining 96 trials depicted a combination of parametric
variations in temporal and spatial continuity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixteen right-handed, native English speaking college students at
the University of Pennsylvania participated in Experiment 1. All
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and were
naïve to the purposes of the experiment. All participants gave
written informed consent prior to participation in the study. The
University of Pennsylvania’s Institutional Review Board approved
the study.
Materials
Stimuli were 2 s animated video clips, generated in Strata 3D,
depicting a blue ball colliding with a red ball (i.e., a launch-
ing event). Contact of the blue ball then “launched” the red
ball (Figure 1). Temporal contiguity was parametrically varied
between the contact of the blue ball and initial movement of the
red ball (seven time delays: 0, 33, 67, 100, 133, 200, 267 ms). Spa-
tial continuity was parametrically varied by changing the angle
of egress of the red ball (seven angles: 0˚, 7.5˚, 15˚, 22.5˚, 30˚,
45˚, and 60˚). The speed (9 cm/s), distance traveled (4.5 cm), and
size (1.5 cm diameter) of each ball were constant. Videos were pre-
sented using Presentation experimentation software on a Windows
XP computer.
Experimental design
Stimuli from Experiment 1 presented launching events where the
blue ball approached the red ball along the horizontal axis (see
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Parametric manipulations of spatial continuity and (B)
temporal contiguity common to all experiments. Balls on the left were blue
(r =14, g =5, b=223), balls on the right were red (r =255, g =0, b=0),
and the background was gray (r =192, g =192, b= 192).
Figure 1A). Upon contact of the blue ball, the time delay of initial
movement of the red ball varied (Figure 1B) followed by variation
in its angle of egress (Figure 1A). All possible combinations of time
delays and angle changes resulted in 49 different stimulus condi-
tions. Each stimulus was presented twice (total trials= 98). Only
two of the 98 events demonstrated direct causal events (i.e., no
time delay or change in angle). Videos were presented in random
order. Each video was followed by a fixation cross with a variable
duration of 2–8 s (average 5 s). Testing time in Experiment 1 was
∼12 min.
Procedures
Participants judged the causal relationship between the balls using
a two-alternative forced choice design (Instructions: In every
video, you will see a blue object and a red object move across the
screen. You will be asked to judge whether the blue object caused
the red object to move. We are interested only in your perception.
There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond as quickly
as possible to each video. Press “index finger” if you believe the
blue object caused the red object to move. Press “middle finger”
if you do not). Participants responded with the dominant hand
and were asked to push a button with the index finger (Yes/causal)
or middle finger (No/non-causal). Participants were first exposed
to six representative practice trials before proceeding with the test
trials. Practice trials were the same for all three experiments in the
present manuscript and only one of the six trials demonstrated a
direct causal launch. All participants were tested in a quiet testing
room with the door closed to prevent distraction.
Analyses
In all experiments, generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) were
applied to evaluate the contribution of changes in time delay and
in angle to the odds of making a causal judgment, which explicitly
model within-subject correlation by using subject-specific ran-
dom effects. GLMM were calculated using the Proc NLMIXED
procedure in SAS and variables were non-centered. Time delay
and angle changes were coded in milliseconds and degrees, respec-
tively. Trial number was included in GLMM to evaluate effects of
experience over time. This factor is particularly important because
each of the three present experiments contain different numbers
of total trials. Parameter estimates from GLMM were evaluated
for both sign and significance as an indication of sensitivity to
variation in violations of time and space and significant use of
either time or space for the judgment of causality, respectively.
Significant Trial×Time or Trial× Space interactions would sug-
gest that experience with launching events over the duration of the
experiment influenced participants’ inferences of causality.
RESULTS
Generalized linear mixed models analysis demonstrated that par-
ticipants used kinematic temporal and spatial information to infer
causality (see Table 1 for parameter estimates). There was no main
effect of Trial, nor any significant interactions (e.g., Trial×Time,
Trial× Space, Time× Space; Table 1). Negative parameter esti-
mates in main effects of Time and Space demonstrate that partic-
ipants were more likely to judge an event as causal with smaller
time delays and angle deviations (see top panel of Figure 2; see
Table 2 for mean values).
DISCUSSION
Results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that participants use
kinematic temporal and spatial information to infer causal rela-
tionships in launching events. The absence of Trial×Time or
Trial× Space interactions suggests that over the course of the
experiment participants did not alter their use of time and space to
infer causality. These results provide us with a baseline to examine
context effects. If contextual information provided by recent and
ongoing exposure to direct causal events plays a significant role
in how kinematic temporal and spatial information contribute to
causality, increasing participants’ exposure to direct causal events
should alter how participants’ use time and space to infer causal
relationships in launching events. In contrast, if contextual infor-
mation provided by increased exposure to direct causal events does
not influence our use of time and space to causality, there should
be no effect of increased exposure to “causal context.”
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, participants were presented with more direct
causal launches (25%) than in Experiment 1 (2%). If the con-
textual experience provided by proportionate exposure to direct
causal events modulates participants’ inferences of causality, the
temporal, and spatial intervals associated with causal inferences
should change with increased presentation of launches depicting
direct causal events. Unlike Powesland (1959), increased exposure
to causal context was not presented in a series of practice trials
before the actual test trials or in a block of example trials between
blocks of test trials. Instead, more direct causal events were ran-
domly inserted into the test trials. If Powesland’s (1959) contextual
findings generalize to ongoing exposures, participants would use
smaller kinematic temporal parameters to infer causal relationship
with increased exposure to direct causal launches. Additionally,
previous research has yet to demonstrate an influence of contex-
tual information on people’s use of kinematic spatial parameters
to infer causal relationships. We predict that space will also be
affected by the contextual information of increased exposure to
direct causal events. However, if participants are insensitive to the
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FIGURE 2 | Change in the percent of temporal and spatial parameter
combinations judged causal across experiments (Top: Experiment 1,
Middle: Experiment 2; Bottom: Experiment 3). Bubble area represents
the percentage of a unique parameter combination (e.g., 33 ms delay×15˚
angle change) judged causal. Increased bubble sizes for shorter delays and
smaller angle changes, relative to longer delays, and angle changes,
demonstrates that participants were more likely to judge shorter delays and
angles as causal. Decreased size of bubbles across experiments
demonstrates the effects of increased exposure to direct causal launches
across experiments. Means for direct launches were calculated based on
different numbers of trials in each experiment (Experiment 1=2;
Experiment 2=32; Experiment 3=288 trials).
causal context of events, temporal, and spatial parameters asso-
ciated with causal inferences would not change. Alternatively, if
time, but not space, is susceptible to influence from contextual
information, increased exposure to direct causal events will only
influence participants’ use of kinematic temporal information to
infer causal relationships.
In addition to the manipulation of causal context, participants
in Experiment 2 were presented with 25% more trials than par-
ticipants in Experiment 1. Thus, if experience over time plays an
important role in the contribution of time and space to causal
inferences, participants’ use of this information should change
over the course of the experiment and be significantly different
between experiments.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants, materials, design, procedures, and analyses
A new group of sixteen participants meeting the same criteria as
in Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. The design, proce-
dures, and analyses were similar to Experiment 1 except for two
modifications. Participants in Experiment 2 viewed the same 98
launches as in Experiment 1, with an additional 30 clearly causal
launches. Thus, 25% of 128 trials contained unambiguously causal
events. Context condition (i.e., 2 vs. 25% clearly causal events)
was included in a separate GLMM, in addition to trial number,
angle change, and time delay, to evaluate between group differ-
ences in the influence of increased causal context on participants’
use of time and space in inferences of causality. Significant Con-
text×Time and Context× Space interactions would suggest that
exposure to different degrees of causal context influenced par-
ticipants use of time and space when making causal judgments.
Significant Trial×Time or Trial× Space interactions would sug-
gest that participants were adjusting their use of time or space
through the duration of the experiment when making causal
inferences.
RESULTS
Generalized linear mixed models analysis demonstrated that par-
ticipants in Experiment 2 used kinematic temporal and spatial
information when inferring causality (see Table 1 for para-
meter estimates, see middle panel of Figure 2). There was
no main effect of trial, nor any significant interactions in the
model (e.g., Trial×Time, Trial× Space, Time× Space; Table 1).
A GLMM evaluating the influence of causal context conditions
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 demonstrated signifi-
cant Context×Time and Context× Space interactions (Table 1).
All other main effects and interactions in the model were non-
significant (Table 1). Negative parameter estimates from signif-
icant Context×Time and Context× Space interactions suggest
that participants exposed to more direct causal events (25%) were
more conservative in accepting time delays and angle deviations
in judging causal launching events (see top vs. middle panel of
Figure 2; see Table 2 for mean values).
DISCUSSION
During increased exposure to direct causal events, participants
used smaller kinematic temporal and spatial parameters to infer
causal relationships (i.e., more conservative use of time and space),
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Table 2 | Percent of parameter combinations judged causal by experiment.
Angle (˚) Delay (ms) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Angle (˚) Delay (ms) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Percent±SE Percent±SE Percent±SE Percent±SE Percent±SE Percent±SE
0 0 94±4 96±1 96±0.3 22.5 133 38±9 13±6 6±4
0 33 91±5 91±5 84±7 22.5 200 19±7 3±3 6±4
0 67 91±5 71±8 72±8 22.5 267 28±8 6±4 16±7
0 100 78±7 47±9 52±9 30 0 81±7 56±9 48±9
0 133 53±9 52±9 31±8 30 33 63±9 63±9 31±8
0 200 50±9 41±9 28±8 30 67 59±9 31±8 6±4
0 267 47±9 32±9 16±7 30 100 41±9 16±7 6±4
7.5 0 88±6 75±8 63±9 30 133 38±9 13±6 13±6
7.5 33 91±5 61±9 75±8 30 200 31±8 6±4 17±7
7.5 67 81±7 47±9 47±9 30 267 19±7 16±7 13±6
7.5 100 53±9 19±7 32±9 45 0 69±8 47±9 31±8
7.5 133 44±9 44±9 28±8 45 33 63±9 31±8 28±8
7.5 200 41±9 19±7 16±7 45 67 59±9 34±9 13±6
7.5 267 31±8 16±7 3±3 45 100 28±8 13±6 6±4
15 0 88±6 61±9 63±9 45 133 19±7 10±5 9±5
15 33 78±7 56±9 44±9 45 200 16±7 9±5 16±7
15 67 81±7 41±9 22±7 45 267 9±5 3±3 13±6
15 100 53±9 22±7 13±6 60 0 63±9 50±9 20±7
15 133 31±8 25±8 19±7 60 33 63±9 44±9 19±7
15 200 31±8 13±6 13±6 60 67 56±9 25±8 9±5
15 267 31±8 9±5 9±5 60 100 28±8 13±6 9±5
22.5 0 84±7 56±9 38±9 60 133 19±7 13±6 9±5
22.5 33 78±7 69±8 32±9 60 200 13±6 3±3 9±5
22.5 67 63±9 56±9 22±7 60 267 9±5 6±5 6±4
22.5 100 50±9 25±8 25±8 − − − − −
SE, standard error; means for direct launches were calculated based on different numbers of trials in each. Experiment (Experiment 1=2; Experiment 2=32;
Experiment 3=288 trials).
compared to Experiment 1. These results demonstrate that the use
of space, like the use of time, is susceptible to contextual influence
in causal inferences. Participants update their use of time and
space in judging causality based on recent and ongoing experience
with events. The lack of Trial×Time or Trial× Space interactions
suggests that this updating was evident across the duration of this
experiment in a straightforward manner.
EXPERIMENT 3
Participants in Experiment 3 were presented with more direct
causal events (75%) than in the previous two experiments. If par-
ticipants flexibly use time and space to infer causality and the
degree of causal context experienced plays a role in this process,
further increasing participants exposure to causal structure should
amplify effects of the previous experiment.
PARTICIPANTS, MATERIALS, DESIGN, PROCEDURES, AND ANALYSES
A new group of sixteen participants meeting the same criteria as
the previous two experiments participated in Experiment 3. The
design, procedures, and analyses were similar to Experiment 1
and 2 with two exceptions. Participants in Experiment 3 viewed
a block of trials containing 75% clearly causal launches (n= 288)
and 25% with varying temporal and spatial parametric combina-
tions (n= 96; total trials= 384). Context condition (i.e., 2, 25, 75%
direct causal events) was included in a separate GLMM, in addition
to trial number, angle change, and time delay, to evaluate between
group differences in the influence of increased causal context on
participants’ use of time and space to make inferences of causal-
ity. Significant Context×Time and Context× Space interactions
would suggest that exposure to different degrees of causal con-
text influenced participants use of time and space when making
causal judgments. Significant Trial×Time or Trial× Space inter-
actions would suggest that differences between total trial numbers
influenced the contribution of time and space to causal inferences.
RESULTS
Generalized linear mixed models analysis demonstrated that par-
ticipants in Experiment 3 used kinematic temporal and spa-
tial information to infer causality. There was also a main effect
of Trial and both the Trial×Time and Trial× Space inter-
actions were significant. Furthermore, the Time× Space and
Trial×Time× Space interactions were significant (see Table 1 for
parameter estimates). A main effect of Trial suggests that partic-
ipants’ judgments of causality changed over the duration of the
experiment. The significant negative parameter estimates for the
Trial×Time and Trial× Space interactions suggest that as par-
ticipants were exposed to more trials, they became more likely
to reject smaller intervals of time and space as contributing to
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causality than they were earlier in the experiment (i.e., more con-
servative). Two distinct trial-based effects are evident when direct
and indirect launches are plotted separately (Figure 3). Partici-
pants’ consistently judged direct launches as causal throughout
the experiment, with a slight increase in the rate of this judg-
ment over time (positive slope in top of Figure 3). In contrast,
participants’ judgments of indirect launches became more con-
servative over time (i.e., more likely to reject smaller intervals
of time and space; negative slope in bottom of Figure 3). Thus,
effects of trial in Experiment 3 appear to be driving changes in
causal judgments on indirect launching events. However, a GLMM
analysis containing only indirect launches failed to demonstrate a
significant effect of Trial [Parameter Estimate (Est.)=−0.0003,
SE= 0.001, t =−0.18, p= 0.85], Trial×Time (Est.=−2.5E−5,
SE= 1.4E−5, t =−1.7, p= 0.08), Trial× Space (Est.=−3E−5,
SE= 5.8E−5, t =−0.56, p= 0.57), or a Trial×Time× Space
interaction (Est.= 5.7E−7, SE= 4.7E−7, t = 1.2, p= 0.22), mak-
ing clear interpretation of these data less than straightforward.
In terms of the Time× Space interaction, participants in Exper-
iment 3 generally demonstrated a decreased likelihood of causal
judgment with increasing time delays. However, for angle devia-
tions between 15˚ and 45˚, participants also demonstrated a slight
increase in the likelihood of causal judgment on longer time
delay parameters (see Table 2). Thus, certain combinations of
temporal and spatial parameters altered participants’ likelihood
of making a causal judgment. This pattern likely resulted in the
Time× Space interaction in Experiment 3. The positive parameter
for the Trial×Time× Space interaction suggests that this pattern
was more pervasive as trial number increased in Experiment 3.
A separate GLMM evaluating the influence of causal context
conditions between Experiment 1, 2, and 3 demonstrated signifi-
cant Context×Time and Context× Space interactions (Table 1).
FIGURE 3 | Percent of trials judged causal as a function of trial number
for direct and indirect trial types in Experiment 3. The positive trend line
(slope= 0.014) for direct launches demonstrates that participants were
slightly more likely to judge direct launching events as causal over the
duration of Experiment 3. In contrast, the negative trend line
(slope=−0.04) for indirect launches demonstrates that participants were
less likely to judge indirect launching events as causal over the duration of
Experiment 3.
There was also a significant Context×Time× Space interac-
tion. All other main effects and interactions in the model were
non-significant (see Table 1). Negative parameter estimates from
Context×Time and Context× Space interactions suggest that
as participants were exposed to more direct causal events, they
were more likely to use smaller intervals of time and space to
make causal inferences on launching events (Figures 2 and 4;
Table 2). Consistent with the graphic depiction of the data in
Figure 4, participants exposed to more direct causal launches typ-
ically only accepted smaller time delays and spatial angles as causal.
The Context×Time× Space interaction was likely driven by the
Time× Space interaction in Experiment 3, but not in Experiments
1 or 2. However, this interaction could mean that interactions
between time and space were stronger across experiments with
more direct causal events (see Table 2; Figure 2). The absence of
significant Time× Space interactions in or between Experiments
1 and 2 (Table 1) make the latter hypothesis less likely.
DISCUSSION
A further increase in exposure to direct causal launches resulted
in participants being more conservative in their use of kinematic
temporal and spatial information to infer causality (Figures 2 and
4). The significant effects of Trial in Experiment 3, and not the
earlier experiments, may have been because of the greater num-
ber of trials in this experiment. Figure 3 demonstrates that trial
effects were related in part to changes in judgments on indirect
launches, with participants less likely to call events “causal” as the
experiment proceeded. In contrast, direct launches were more con-
sistently judged as causal than indirect launches. A greater number
of trials than were present in Experiments 1 and 2 may have been
needed to detect these subtle effects. The trial effect in Experiment
3 is also consistent with the idea that as participants were exposed
to more direct launches they judged a lower percentage of other
trial types as causal (Figure 4). The Context×Time and Con-
text× Space interactions in the GLMM of the three causal context
conditions demonstrates that the context of apprehending events
plays a strong role in modulating how kinematic temporal and spa-
tial information contribute to inferences of causality in launching
events. These data suggest that participants flexibly update their
representation of how kinematic temporal and spatial information
relate to causal relationships in events.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Contextual information plays an important role in how we inter-
pret the relationship between time, space, and causality. The ability
to infer causality from kinematic temporal and spatial informa-
tion is central to our understanding of events in the environment,
as well as our ability to predict future outcomes and plan goal-
directed actions (Wolff, 2007, 2008). People adjust the temporal
and spatial parameters they associate with causality to accommo-
date the context in which they apprehend launching events (see
Table 2; Figures 2 and 4). Others have demonstrated that con-
text influences the contribution of time to inferences of causality
(e.g., Powesland, 1959; Buehner and May, 2002, 2003). Our data
demonstrate that context effects also extend to the use of spatial
information in causal inferences.
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FIGURE 4 | Difference in the percent of trials judged as causal
(y -axis) for all combinations of temporal and spatial parameters
(x -axis) in the 2, 25, and 75% causal context conditions. Standard
error bars are included for each combination of time and space. The
smaller area coverage for the 75% context condition (dark gray)
demonstrates more conservative use of spatial and temporal parameters
vs. the 25% (white) and 2% (light gray) context conditions. Means for
direct launches were calculated based on different numbers of trials in
each experiment (Experiment 1=2; Experiment 2=32; Experiment
3=288 trials).
Prior work on the effects of foreknowledge (e.g., Schlottmann,
1999; Buehner and May, 2002, 2003) on causal inferences demon-
strates that participants flexibly use kinematic information to
infer causality. That is to say, people adjust their judgments of
the relationship between time and causality based on contex-
tual information, such as how events are framed before they
are encountered. Our findings along with those of Gruber et al.
(1957) and Powesland (1959) suggest that flexibility in causal
inferences also occurs in an ongoing way during the unfolding of
events. These effects may arise from top-down knowledge obtained
through ongoing observation of changes in the events occurring
in our environment. Alternatively, these effects may arise from
perceptual anchoring, a form of perceptual adaptation (Helson,
1964). In this view, changes in the use of time to make causal
judgments may reflect perceptual adaptive processes respond-
ing to prototypical causal or non-causal trials presented during
practice. Whereas knowledge-based manipulations are not attrib-
utable to perceptual adaptation, experience-based effects could
arise from such an effect. As discussed by Hecht (1996), distin-
guishing between perceptual adaptation and a top-down process
for such experience-based effects is exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible.
Regardless of the underlying mechanisms, our results suggest
that studies using a narrow range of temporal and spatial viola-
tions (e.g., the present experiments; Michotte, 1946/1963) produce
a rapid decline in the likelihood of making causal judgments for
launches with increasing time delays, spatial gaps, or angle devia-
tions. In contrast, studies using a broader range of temporal and
spatial violations appear to produce a more gradual decline in the
likelihood of endorsing causality in events as violations of time
and space increase (e.g., Young et al., 2005). For example, Young
et al. (2005) presented participants with launching events with a
range of temporal delays between 0 and 2 s, vs. the 0–267 ms range
in the present study. Across both studies, a similar pattern of causal
judgment was found across the overall range of temporal parame-
ters. That is to say, participants in Young et al. (2005) responded
to the 2 s delay much the same as our participants responded to a
267 ms delay. In contrast, a 500 ms delay in Young et al’s. (2005)
study was more often judged as causal (∼65%) than our 267 ms
delay. Collectively, these results suggest that participants respond
to contextual information provided by the overall range of tempo-
ral and spatial violations they experience in launching events. The
present research also suggests that people are sensitive to contex-
tual information provided by their recent experience with direct
causal events. Although the three experiments from the present
work contained the same range of temporal and spatial violations,
participants were less likely to judge events with longer delays and
greater angle violations as causal when they experienced more
direct launching events.
Contextually driven changes in people’s use of time and space
to infer causality suggest the categories “causal” and “non-causal”
are applied flexibly to events. Schwarz (1999) demonstrated that
when categories, like “frequent,” “important,” or “successful,” lack
clear boundaries, they are malleable and susceptible to contex-
tual influence. Our category of causality might similarly lack clear
boundaries and thus lend itself to flexibility in its application to
events.
The flexibility of criteria used to make causal inferences may
also have implications for its expression in disease. For exam-
ple, people with paranoid schizophrenia or obsessive-compulsive
disorder (OCD) often infer causal relationships where none
exists (e.g., Tschacher and Kupper, 2006; Dettore, 2011). In
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contrast, children with autism can fail to comprehend causal rela-
tionships in events in their social environment (e.g., Ray and
Schlottmann, 2007). Difficulty integrating contextual informa-
tion into one’s judgment of causality may play a role in disorders
with impaired comprehension of causal relationships in physical
and social events. Future studies investigating patients’ ability to
flexibly update their representation of the relationship between
time, space, and causality in response to changing contextual
information will test this hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
Our findings show that even in simple mechanical launch-
ing events, recent and ongoing contextual information modu-
lates the way that kinematic temporal and spatial information
contribute to causal inferences. Situations we encounter in
our environment vary considerably. Accounting for contextual
information in our representation of causality allows integra-
tions of novel, varied, and relevant information with a per-
son’s own experiences and expectations when making causal
inferences. The ability to integrate contextual information
into our inferences of causality is likely of adaptive signifi-
cance.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by funding from the National Insti-
tute of Health (T32NS007413 and R01 DC008779). We would
like to thank the reviewers and Dr. Rui Xiao for their helpful
comments.
REFERENCES
Blakemore, S. J., Boyer, P., Pachot-
Clouard, M., Meltzoff, A., Sege-
barth, C., and Decety, J. (2003). The
detection of contingency and ani-
macy from simple animations in
the human brain. Cereb. Cortex 13,
837–844.
Blakemore, S. J., Fonlupt, P., Pachot-
Clouard, M., Darmon, C., Boyer, P.,
Meltzoff,A. N., et al. (2001). How the
brain perceives causality: an event-
related fMRI study. Neuroreport 12,
3741–3746.
Buehner, M. J., and Humphreys, G.
R. (2010). Causal contraction: spa-
tial binding in the perception of
collision events. Psychol. Sci. 21,
44–48.
Buehner, M. J., and May, J. (2002).
Knowledge mediates the timeframe
of covariation assessment in human
causal induction. Think. Reason. 8,
269–295.
Buehner, M. J., and May, J. (2003).
Rethinking temporal contiguity and
the judgment of causality: effects
of prior knowledge, experience, and
reinforcement procedure. Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 56A, 865–890.
De Martino, D., Kumaran, D., Seymour,
B., and Dolan, R. J. (2006). Frames,
biases, and rational decision-making
in the human brain. Science 313,
684–687.
Dettore, D. (2011). Obsessive-
compulsive disorder and thinking
illusions. Psicoterapia Cognitiva e
Comportamentale 17, 381–394.
Dror, I. E., Charlton, D., and Peron, A. E.
(2006). Contextual information ren-
ders experts vulnerable to making
erroneous identifications. Forensic
Sci. Int. 156, 74–78.
Gruber, H. E., Fink, C. D., and Damm,
V. (1957). Effects of experience on
the perception of causality. J. Exp.
Psychol. 53, 89–93.
Guski, R., and Troje, N. F. (2003).
Audiovisual phenomenal causality.
Percept. Psychophys. 65, 789–800.
Hecht, H. (1996). Heuristics and invari-
ants in dynamic event percep-
tion: immunized concepts or non
statements? Psychon. Bull. Rev. 3,
61–70.
Helson, H. (1964). Current trends and
issues in adaptation-level theory.
Am. Psychol. 19, 26–38.
Hume, D. (1740/1960). A Treatise of
Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hume, D. (1748/1977).AnEnquiryCon-
cerningHumanUnderstanding. Indi-
anapolis: Hackett.
Leslie, A. M. (1982). The perception of
causality in infants. Perception 11,
173–186.
Leslie, A. M. (1984). Spatiotemporal
continuity and the perception of
causality in infants. Perception 13,
287–305.
Leslie, A. M., and Keeble, S. (1987).
Do six-month-old infants perceive
causality? Cognition 25, 265–288.
Michotte,A. E. (1946/1963).ThePercep-
tion of Causality, trans. T. R. Miles
and E. Miles. London: Methuen.
Oakes, L. M., and Cohen, L. B. (1990).
Infant perception of a causal event.
Cogn. Dev. 5, 193–207.
Powesland, P. F. (1959). The effect
of practice upon the perception
of causality. Can. J. Psychol. 13,
155–168.
Ray, E. D., and Schlottmann, A.
(2007). The perception of social and
mechanical causality in young chil-
dren with ASD. Res. Autism Spectr.
Disord. 1, 266–280.
Rohrbaugh, C. C., and Shanteau, J.
(1999). “Context, process, and expe-
rience: research on applied judg-
ment and decision making,” in
Handbook ofAppliedCognition, ed. F.
Durso (New York, NY: John Wiley),
115–139.
Roser, M. E., Fugelsang, J. A., Dun-
bar, K. N., Corballis, P. M., and
Gazzaniga, M. S. (2005). Dissociat-
ing processes supporting causal per-
ception and causal inference in the
brain. Neuropsychology 19, 591–602.
Schlottmann, A. (1999). Seeing it hap-
pen and knowing how it works:
how children understand the rela-
tion between perceptual causality
and underlying mechanisms. Dev.
Psychol. 3, 303–317.
Schlottmann, A., and Anderson, N. H.
(1993). An information integration
approach to phenomenal causality.
Mem. Cognit. 21, 785–801.
Schlottmann, A., and Shanks, D. R.
(1992). Evidence for a distinc-
tion between judged and perceived
causality. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 44A,
321–342.
Schlottmann, A., Ray, E., Mitchell, A.,
and Demetriou, N. (2006). Per-
ceived physical and social causality
in animated motions: spontaneous
reports and ratings. Acta Psychol.
(Amst) 123, 112–143.
Scholl, B. J., and Tremoulet, P. (2000).
Perceptual causality and animacy.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 299–309.
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: how
the questions shape the answers.Am.
Psychol. 54, 93–105.
Shanks, D. R. (1985). Forward and back-
ward blocking in human contin-
gency judgment. Q. J. Exp. Psychol.
37B, 1–21.
Straube, B., and Chatterjee, A. (2010).
Space and time in perceptual causal-
ity. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:28.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00028
Tschacher, W., and Kupper, Z. (2006).
Perception of causality in schizo-
phrenia spectrum disorder. Schizo-
phr. Bull. 32, 106–112.
Wolff, P. (2007). Representing cau-
sation. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 136,
82–111.
Wolff, P. (2008).“Dynamics and the per-
ception of causal events,” in Under-
standing Events, eds T. F. Shipley and
J. M. Zacks (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press), 555–585.
Wolpert, L. (2003). Causal belief and the
origins of technology. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. A 361, 1709–1719.
Wolpert, L. (2006). Six ImpossibleThings
Before Breakfast. London: Faber &
Faber.
Wolpert, L. (2009). Cognition: evolu-
tion does help to explain how minds
work. Nature 459, 506.
Young, M. E., Rogers, E. T., and
Beckmann, J. S. (2005). Causal
impressions: predicting when, not
just where. Mem. Cognit. 33,
320–331.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 16 May 2012; paper pend-
ing published: 19 June 2012; accepted:
11 September 2012; published online: 01
October 2012.
Citation: Woods AJ, Lehet M and Chat-
terjee A (2012) Context modulates the
contribution of time and space in causal
inference. Front. Psychology 3:371. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00371
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Perception Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Woods, Lehet and
Chatterjee. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are cred-
ited and subject to any copyright notices
concerning any third-party graphics etc.
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 371 | 9
